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WRIGHT v. ROCKEFELLER AND LEGISLATIVE GERRY-
MANDERS: THE DESEGREGATION DECISIONS
PLUS A PROBLEM OF PROOF
THE historical and present significance of the electoral gerrymander 1-the
manipulation of the configuration and thereby the character of the population
of political districts 2-- parallels that of the malapportionment of voting dis-
tricts,3 for both are methods by which legislatures may vest or freeze unchal-
lengeable electoral power in favored groups. But because gerrymandered dis-
tricts may often be based on such factors as race, religion, party affiliation, or
nationality, challenges to such districting on the ground of equal protection
present considerations distinct from those of the now more familiar complaint
against legislative districts of unequal population. The case of Wright v. Rocke-
feller 4 represents the first of the post-Baker v. Carr r challenges to the power
of legislatures to create political districts that conform to racial and ethnic
lines.6 Although two members of the three judge panel in Wright believed that
1. The word has its roots in early American history, having been coined in 1812 to
describe a salamander shaped district drawn for the eastern shore of Massachusetts during
the administration of Governor Elbridge Gerry. "How's that for a salamander?" the party
who first noted the resemblance of the district to the reptile was reported to have asked.
"Better call it a Gerrymander" was the recorded retort which made etymological history.
See Tabor, The Gerrymandering of State and Federal Legislative Districts, 16 MD. L.
R v. 277, 278 n.6 (1956).
In some accounts, the dialogue is reported as having occurred between a Massachusetts
newspaper editor, Benjamin Russell, and the famous American portraitist. Gilbert Stuart,
with credit for the word going to Russell. 2 WEsrn's ITEmrAT0 AL Dxero:nAY 1052
(2d ed. 1957).
2. Although the term has been used to describe situations on the basis of a comparative
survey of populations of like districts, it is restricted in this Note to situations involving
districts varying greatly in physical form from ordinary geometric norms.
3. The term "malapportionment" is used to refer to the situation alluded to in note 2
supra. For examples of the difference between malapportionment and gerrymander, see
Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HAv. L. REv. 1057, 1059,
1060 (1958).
4. 211 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court filed,
January, 1963. See also Honeywood v. Rockefeller, Civil No. 62C243, E.D.N.Y, denial of
preliminary injunction aff'd, 371 U.S. 1 (1962). The latter case involves a challenge similar
in its constitutional nature to Wright, differing in its specific fact setting.
5. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6. The Tuskeegee gerrymander case, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), was
regarded by the trial panel in Wright as sufficient to dispose of the question of its justici-
ability under both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. IfWright may not be a signifi-
cant aftermath of Baker v. Carr in terms of the formal applicability or non-applicability of
the "political question" doctrine, but it is a test of the extent to which Baker has triggered
"a sharp increase in judicial readiness to inquire into the architecture of the legislative
establishment." Pollak, Judicial Power and "the Politics of the People," 72 Ymx.s L.J. 81,
82 (1962).
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states may not draw voting district lines on the basis of race, or national origin,
the case may have left legislatures almost entirely free to draw voting district
lines on any criteria so long as the population disparity between districts does
not exceed a figure in and of itself subject to constitutional attack. For the court
left the guidelines for proving racial or ethnic districting sufficiently undefined
as to make a showing of state districting on the basis of race or ethnic factors
extremely problematical. As is indicated in the three separate opinions in
Wright, the case presents not only the question of the constitutionality under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of racially and ethnically drawn
district lines but also the perhaps more difficult evidentiary question of how
parties prove that the state has so acted.
Following the 1960 census, the number of Congressmen allotted to the State
of New York was decreased by two.7 In accordance with a practice of respect-
ing county boundary lines within the City of New York and minimizing the
number of legislative districts composed of fractional parts of two different
counties,8 the 1961 New York Apportionment Act reduced the Congressional
delegation of New York County (the Borough of Manhattan) from six to
four.9 Plaintiffs in the Wright case, Negro and Puerto Rican residents of the
four Manhattan congressional districts, established the following about the new
political alignment of the Borough:
The decision in Baker would seem to have laid to rest the formal question of justici-
ability of congressional, as well as state legislative, apportionments. See 369 U.S. at 232;
Black, Inequities ih Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colgrove v. Green, 72
YAIE L.J. 13 (1962). But see Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga, 1962),
criticized in Comment, 63 CoLUm. L. REv. 98 (1963).
7. See INTERIm REPORT OF THE JOINT LEG SLATIVE CommirrE ON RrArroirtxNM14NT,
N.Y. Sess. Law 1961, Second Extra Session, pp. 63, 65. [Hereinafter cited as N.Y. RtroaT.]
8. The representational pattern of New York State's districting schemes is county
oriented. The federal panel which upheld the apportionment of the New York State Legis-
lature did so largely in light of its recognition of the historic importance the state had
placed on making its counties as politically independent and self contained as possible.
W.M.C.A. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ("In New York, the county
is a classic unit of governmental organization and administration."). This was done in spite
of substantial population variances among the various state legislative seats. 208 . Supp,
at 378-79. On the latter point, see generally Silva, Apportionment of the New York Senate,
30 FORDIAm L. Rnv. 595 (1962) ; Silva, Apportionment of the New York Assefflbly, 31
FoRDH. L. REv. 1 (1962). For a discussion of the constitutionality of New York'ws appor-
tionment, see Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apportionments: A Problem of
Standards, 72 YALE L.J. 968, 1019-27 (1963).
The sole descriptive appendix to the bill setting up the State's congressional districts
described the congressional districts in terms of the relation of each to the county or counties
they were in N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961, Second Extra Session, ch. 980, Exhibit B. Of the
nineteen congressional districts set within the City of New York, only one contains frac-
tional parts of two different boroughs . . . with all the others but the one which contains
the Borough of Richmond-not in and of itself large enough to merit its own congressional
seat . . . being set entirely within individual boroughs. Within Manhattan, the four con-
gressional districts were self-contained in accord with the historical state pattern of counties
functioning as independent representational entities.




1. With a Borough population established by the census as 37. 7 per cent
non-white and Puerto Rican,' 0 one of the newly fashioned districts, the 17th,
contained a population 94.9 per cent white. An adjacent district, the 18th, con-
tained a population 86.6 per cent non-white and Puerto Rican."
2. The 17th District was 12 per cent-15 per cent smaller in population than
any of the other Manhattan districts, with all of the others roughly the same
size.12 -
3. The_17th.District was incapable of expansion in any direction without
incorporating a non-white population concentration heavier than that found on
the inside of its border lines.'
3
4. Through three successive apportionment acts, the 17th District had de-
veloped from an essentially rectangular figure to an irregular 31 sided figure
carved out of the middle of the Borough. 14 Starting with 1941 Apportionment
Act, the beginning of a conformance with racial residency patterns wlas shown,
as the configuration of the District began to assume an irregular shape and
approximate the press of Manhattan's non-white population. The previously
straight northerly border of the District became somewhat jagged in 1941, and
finally assumed the step shaped pattern in 1951 that was retained by the 1961
act.'5
10. The 1960 census divided the ethnic groups of New York City into only two classes:
"white" and "non-white and Puerto Rican." See 211 F. Supp. at 472 (Murphy, J., dis-
senting).
11. The four Manhattan Congressional Districts were broken down as follows in terms
of their racial make-ups and relative populations:
Total White Non-White and Puerto
District Popula- Population % of District Rican Origin
tion Population % of District
17th 382,320 362,668 94.9% 19,652 5.1%
18th 431,330 59,216 13.7% 372,114 86.3%
19th 445,175 318,223 71.5% 126,952 28.5%
20th 439,456 318,482 72.5% 120,974 27.5%
Total 1,698,281 1,058,589 62.3% 639,692 37.7%
211 F. Supp. at 472 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
12. Ibid.
13. See 211 F. Supp. at 470 (Feinberg, J., concurring). In the one instance where a
predominantly white area adjacent to the 17th Congressional District had not been incor-
porated in it, the plaintiffs showed that the region did not have a very large population
and that it had recently been set aside by the City of New York for a public-housing
project. Record, p. 165. See BOARD 0F ESTIMATE RESOLu Tor OF THE Crr, oF Nsw Yo.,
CALENDAR No. 288. Figures for the racial composition of such projects already in existence
in Manhattan currently stand at 73A% non-white. See Letter from New York Housing
Authority introduced as Exhibit 7. Record, p. 237.
14. The 1961 apportionment, however, reduced the number of lines in the 17th Con-
gressional District from 49 to 31. 211 F. Supp. at 470 n.8.
15. See Plaintiffs' Post-Trial and Reply Memorandum, pp. 17-20. The westerly border
of the 17th Congressional District, the only one which the 1961 Apportionment Act did not
alter, remained somewhat jagged even though a general straightening of the lines would
not measurably have altered the racial composition of the 17th. One of the Wright judges
took this to show an absence of a legislative purpose to draw the lines on a racial basis.
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5. Although the district lines of the 17th district on the eastern border be-
came somewhat more symmetrical as a result of the addition of two sections in
1961, the two major sections added were the two remaining population con-
centrations having the Borough's highest percentage of white voters.10 In ad-
dition, two square blocks whose racial character had changed drastically from
the time of the 1951 apportionment and was 44.5 per cent Negro and Puerto
Rican in 1961 were eliminated from the 17th district.17 This excission and the
addition of the two predominantly white neighborhoods were the only changes
made in the 17th District by the 1961 Apportionment Act.
The three judge court denied relief to the plaintiffs, each judge writing a
separate opinion. Because the opinion of Judge Moore does not explicitly
separate the evidentiary question from the constitutional issue, it is not clear
whether he believed that legislative districting on the basis of race or national
origin was constitutionally permissible. His treatment of the facts of the case,
however, suggests that racial or ethnic districting is not in and of itself im-
permissible unless accompanied by an additional showing of harm to the iso-
lated groups. Judge Moore's discussion of the population disparity between
relevant districts, based on a comparison of the 17th District with the aver-
age district in the state rather than a comparison of the 17th with the three
other Manhattan districts, indicates that he was seeking some harm-dilution
of voting strength-independent of the alleged injury resulting from racial
or ethnic classification. Since Manhattan county was established as a distinct
political unit for purposes of congressional representation,18 the population dis-
parity between Manhattan districts is a highly significant factor in finding a
legislative purpose to create a predominantly white election district, while the
population disparity between the 17th and the average state district is relevant
only to a determination of whether the malapportionment of a district exceeds
permissible tolerances. 19 Moreover, Judge Moore's opinion does not deal with
Opinion of Judge Feinberg, 211 F. Supp. at 470. However, state refusal to redraw tlt!
western boundary because it already suited a general purpose of creating racially homo-
geneous districts can equally be inferred. In addition, the line straightening contemplated
by Judge Feinberg would have resulted in a loss of 19,000 persons from the 17th district.
Record, p. 134, and might thereby have heightened the population disparity between tie
17th district and the others in Manhattan to an independently challengeable level.
16. The neighborhood added to the northeastern border of the 17th Congressional
District had a population of 101,716, of whom 2,749, or 2.7% were non-whites and Puerto
Ricans. Record, pp. 124-25. The Stuyvesant Town community on the southeastern border-
almost wholly white under sanction of judicial decree, see Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town, 299
N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950)-was the second section
added to the 17th district. Out of a total population of 22,405, there were 105 non-whites
and Puerto Ricans. Record, pp. 124-25.
17. Record, pp. 139-40.
18. See note 8 .mpra. See also 211 F. Supp. at 466.
19. The disparity between the population of any given New York State congressional
district and the weighted average population per district at no point rises above 15%, the
deviance standard recommended by the American Political Science Association. See N.Y.
REPoRT at 64. The deviance between the population of the 17th Congressional District and
the average state district is 7%. 211 F. Supp. at 464. But cf. New York Times, January 23,
1962, p. 32, col. 2 (editorial):
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the irregular, thirty-one sided configuration of the 17th congressional district,
apparently because the shape of a district in which a voter is placed involves no
independent harm to a voter. The serpentine configuration, however, consti-
tuted a crucial element in the plaintiff's attempt to prove that the basis of the
districting was racial and ethnic.
Although there are some elements in Judge Moore's opinion which suggest
a different view on the constitutional question than the one implied by the major
part of itj ° it is important to note that Judge Feinberg continually character-
ized Judge Moore's opinion as holding the act of racial districting in and of it-
self constitutionally permissible.2 1 At no point did Judge Moore explicitly re-
ject this contention.
Judge Feinberg, although concurring with Judge Moore in the disposition of
the case, expressly rejected the proposition that race is a permissible standard
by which legislatures may draw district lines:
If plaintiffs had proved that the district lines were constituted on a racial
basis, the fact that plaintiffs had an undiminished right to vote in such
gerrymandered districts would be irrelevant. The constitutional vice would
be use by the legislature of an impermissible standard, and the harm to
plaintiffs that need be shown is only that such a standard was used.2
However, he believed that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that any of the
Manhattan districts had in fact been drawn on a racial basis, finding that such
facts as the addition of the two predominantly white neighborhoods to the 17th
District could be explained on social and economic grounds as well as racial
ones.2 Moreover, this addition, in reducing the irregularity of the contours of
the 17th district, indicated that the 1961 redistricting was pursued in a "logical"
and "rational" manner?24 And he found that the slight population disparity be-
tween the 17th District and the average district in the state provided insufficient
support for an inference of racial gerrymandering.2 z- Because Judge Feinberg
A letter on this page ... defends New York's recent realignment of Congressional
districts by virtually ignoring the gerrymandering and pointing to the one respect
in which proper standards did rule-relative equality of population.
Representative government requires more than this. (Emphasis added.]
20. At one point, Judge Moore suggests that "To create districts based uporr equal
proportions of the various races inhabiting metropolitan areas would indeed be to indulge
in practices verging on the unconstitutional." 211 F. Supp. at 468. The statement implies
that the act of racial districting might be sufficient to overturn an apportionment statute.
If that is so, it is difficult to understand Judge Moore's failure to deal with those elements
of the plaintiffs' case in Wright which attempted to prove racial districting on the part of
the State. See text at notes 18 and 19 supra. But see note 48 infra.
21. 211 F. Supp. at 468.
22. Id. at 468.
23. Id. at 471.
24. Id. at 470-71.
25. Judge Feinberg's use of the average state district as a basis of comparison with
the 17th Congressional District is difficult to understand, given his acceptance of the con-
stitutional principle that racial districting is impermissible and given the fact that Manhat-
tan may be viewed as a self-contained community insofar as its congressional districts are
concerned. See text at notes 18 and 19 supra.
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regarded the obligation to disprove all permissible alternative bases for district-
ing as part of the plaintiff's showing of purposive racial districting, he found
that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case.
Judge Murphy, concurring in Judge Feinberg's view of the constitutional is-
sue, found that the plaintiff's evidence established a "prima facie case of legis-
lative intent to draw congressional district lines in the 17th and 18th Districts
on the basis of race and national origin."26 The state's failure to introduce any
evidence rebutting this inference, he believed, warranted relief.
The Equal Protection Case -
The kind of equal protection case presented by Wright should be distin-
guished from what may be called the more typical equal protection case, which
generally poses the question of whether the persons injured or benefited by a
statute represent the class of persons who should be so treated, given the pur-
pose of the statute.23 Most statutes held violative of the equal protection clause
26. 211 F. Supp. at 473.
27.. Compare Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 43 (1962)
("Is it irrational or otherwise forbidden so to gerrymander districts that a solid negro or
Puerto Rican vote is ensured, thus making certain that legislative bodies will contain mem-
bers of these minority groups?"), with Emerson, Malapportionment and Jtdicial Power,
72 YALE L.J. 64, 74 (1962) ("[A]n apportionment system based on racial factors would
clearly constitute a denial of equal protection.").
Cf. the statement of Mr. Justice Whittaker in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, "[F]encing Negro
citizens out of Division A and into Division B is an unlawful segregation of races of
citizens, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 364
U.S. at 349. The issue in Wright may be said to consist of the applicability of Mr. Justice
Whittaker's principle to situations in which the harm to the groups "fenc[ed] out" is less
demonstrable than it was in the Tuskeegee gerrymander.
28. The statutory purpose referred to does not suggest judicial psychoanalysis of the
collective states of mind of a given set of legislators with respect to a bill at the time
it was passed. It rather deals with a practice in which the courts have traditionally in-
dulged; a determination of the intended thrust of a statute through a view of materials
other than the formal words of the statute itself. See Bickel, Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon
-An Unpublished Opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis, 69 Hmv. L. REV. 1177, 1203, 1204
(1956). The balance required in such endeavors is a delicate one, avoiding on the one hand
the impossible ascription of a unitary motive to a diverse group of legislators while meet-
ing, on the other, the judicial responsibility in equal protection cases of determining whether
and to what extent the traits of parties classified reasonably relate to the public good in,
tended to be advanced by the enactment of the classificatory statute. See Tussman & ten
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 344-46 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as Tussman & tenBroek]. So long as there are distinct limits to a given exercise of
power-as for example a predetermined inability of state legislatures to draw district lines
on the basis of race---"it becomes possible quite objectively to assess the only significant
effect of a given [action] as having passed the limits; and it is then acceptable-indeed,
usual-judicial diction to speak of the 'purpose' of the [action] as being constitutionally for-
bidden." BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 209 (1962).
In making determinations of legislative purpose in equal protection cases, the courtg
have of course not been deterred by an absence of legislative candor in enacting statutes
innocuous on their face, but designed to effect a given result. See Yick Wo v. Hopkciq,
118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) ; Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1192, 1197 (1961).
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are either "under-inclusive"--regulating some but not all of the persons bearing
the trait the statute was meant to regulate," or "over-indusive"-including
many persons not bearing the characteristic which the statute, given its pur-
pose, should be concerned with.30 A challenge to this type of statute may be
said to be based upon the state's nanner of classifying. But such laws have been
sharply if not articulately distinguished from statutes in which the challenges
may be said to be bottomed on the fact that the basis on which the state had
classified was impermissible.3 Both types of equal protection cases necessarily
involve a judicial determination of the purpose of the statute in question, but in
"impermissible purpose" challenges like Wright, a court must determine the
legitimacy of the legislative purpose rather than pass on the reasonableness of
the scope of the statute.
Judge Moore appears to treat the challenge to the districting statute in
Wright as belonging to the first type of equal protection problems. Thus, his
opinion seems to assume that the basis of the plaintiffs' complaint in Wright
was their exclusion from other districts.3 2 If this was the equal protection argu-
ment advanced in Wrght, it would justifiably be given short shrift. Challenges
based on a desire to be included in or excluded from a statutory classification
are generally met by a showing that the discrimination as it affects the party
29. Tussman & tenBroek at 347-49. See Missouri K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267,
269-70 (1904).
30. Tussman & tenBroek at 351, 352.
31. When parties who are proper subjects of legislative regulation challenge statutes
on the ground that others ought also to have been included in the statutory classification-
the challenge based on under-inclusiveness-broad judicial tolerance has been the normal
response. See Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Goemert v.
Clary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Given the inherent impossibility of drawing
perfect statutes, i.e., those which include for legislative treatment only and all of those
parties bearing the trait whose regulation is felt necessary, the presence of a single reason-
able basis for a failure to include parties for regulatory treatment who might arguably
have been placed within the reach of the challenged statute has been sufficient to sustain it.
But see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (discrimination between those in-
cluded and excluded for statutory treatment "invidious" although rational).
Challenges to "over inclusive" statutes have been better received, since they are brought
by parties who are affected by statutes which attempt to regulate traits the complainants
do not themselves bear. Over inclusive statutes are sustained, if at all, on the basis of emer-
gency conditions creating circumstances which may justifiably have led legislatures to be
"better safe than sorry." See Tussman & tenBroek, 351, 352. Detention statutes represent
classic examples of over-inclusive classifications. Cf. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act,
28 VA. L. REv. 315, 320-21 (1942) ; Comment, Some Proposals for Moderni:ing the Law
of Arrests, 39 CALn. L. Rnv. 96, 99, 100 (1951).
32. Plaintiffs apparently want a higher percentage of non-whites and Puerto Ricans
in the 17th. [Others] . . . proclaim with equal vehemence that such a change would
be violative of their rights to enjoy the redistricting as it now is. They claim, in
effect, that to take a substantial number of non-whites and Puerto Ricans and to
place them within the confines of a different Congressional district.., would be an
Acadia-like deportation designed to dissipate and make ineffectual their votes.
211 F. Supp. at 465.
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arguing over or under inclusion is such that it could not be described as arbi-
trary or irrational.33 Under this argument a finding that in view of the ordinarily
valid purposes of districting, it was not unreasonable for the state to have estab-
lished election districts of roughly proportionate population would be deter-
minative of the constitutional challenge. Because new district lines had to be
drawn in New York in 1961 lest all its Congressmen be elected at large, it can-
not be said that the legislatures had no business passing a districting statute,
nor, in the absence of malapportionment, that the lines drawn were unreason-
able.34 But the plaintiffs residing in the 17th Congressional district did not ob-
ject to the statute because they had not been placed in the 18th, 19th, or 20th
districts; their objection was instead based on the fact of having been assigned
(it all to districts in which persons had been placed on account of their race or
national origin. Thus, the constitutional objection to the apportionment statute
was that the classificatory basis used by the state was impermissible38
There is much judicial language suggesting that the use of race or national
origin as a basis of statutory classification places a statute in a "constitutionally
suspect" category.36 Some formulations have indicated that race is a "constitu-
tional irrelevance" which the state is never privileged to use,87 while most have
gone no further than to create a presumptive invalidity for all statutes using
racial criteria.38 Because most of the cases in the "forbidden classification"
category have arisen in a context of obvious racial hostility, plaintiffs have not
-at least since the landmark of Brown v. Board of Education 83 -been terribly
pressed to describe the manner in which the challenged statutes have worked
injury upon them. Thus, since Brown the Court has rendered per curiam de-
33. See note 29 mspra.
34. See note 19 mipra.
35. Judge Moore complains that the "[p]laintiffs' theories of unconstitutionality are
difficult to pin down." 211 F. Supp. at 465. At no time did he suggest or confront the pos-
sibility, accepted by Judges Feinberg and Murphy, of a constitutional infirmity based on
the use of racial criteria by the state in the drawing of district lines.
36. Professor Bittker terms the following statement of the Court in Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943), the "inescapable starting point" of any inquiry
into statutes classifying by race:
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.
Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relatioss,
71 YALa L.J. 1387, 1409 (1962).
See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954):
Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since
they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.
And see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
37. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941) (concurring opinion), and see
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 565-66 (1947) (dissenting
opinion). See Tussman & tenBroek at 353-55.
38. See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1192, 1197 (1961).
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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cisions holding racially segregated parks,4 0 beaches,41 golf courses, 42 and so
forth unconstitutional. These cases may be read to mean that any statute which
openly identifies racial groups or physically separates persons of different races
works an, injury on members of a minority group by testifying to their in-
feriority and therefore is invalid.43 On the other hand, they may be read to
mean that any statute which classifies on the basis of race, regardless of demon-
strable immediate injury, is per se or presumptively invalid.44 The applicability
of these decisions under the former interpretation to the districting statute in
Wright is unclear, since the actual physical separation which results from this
statute seems quantitatively, if not qualitatively, distinguishable from the stat-
utes challenged in the Brown and post-Brown cases. The only instance of clear
physical segregation comes at the fleeting moment of using a voting booth every
other November. Moreover, this momentary separation is not an inherent part
of a districting statute. It would not be very difficult for a state to provide for
integrated voting facilities while still maintaining separate political districts.
However, if the principle of the Brown case and its aftermath is a broader one
-i.e., that the Constitution does not tolerate distinctions based upon racial or
ethnic factors, at least in the absence of extraordinary circumstances not yet
known to us 45-these cases would seem to be determinative of the issue in
40. New Orleans City Park Improvemark Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.),
aff'd per curiam, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
40. Dawson v. Mayor & City Council, 200 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 350
U.S. 877 (1955).
42. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 202 F2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), reVd per
curiant, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
43. Cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 & nrll (1954) ; see Garfinkel,
Social Science Evidence and the School Segregation Cases, 21 JouRnAL op PoLITics 37
(1959) ; Address by Will Mfaslow, The Uses of Law in the Struggle for Equality, At-
lantic City, N.J., December, 1954, cited in Calm, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L REv. 150, 157
.16 (1955). See generally, The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegre-
gation: A Social Science Statement, 37 Mixix. L. REv. 427 (1953).
44. Should a plaintiff affirmatively show that he has been injured through the opera-
tion of an admitted or proven racial classification, no one can doubt his right to constitu-
tional relief. Clearly, however, no one may claim the protection of the Constitution unless
someone has been hurt. Whether the person injured must suffer injury unique to him in
order to be the plaintiff involves questions of what has been loosely termed "standing,"
see Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 1265,
1307-12 (1961), Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Prizate Actionm, 75 HARv. L.
REv. 255, 302-05 (1961). It is hard to contest the notion, however, that injury, even if "in
the air," is a condition precedent to a constitutional attack. See Bickel, Foreword: The
Passive Virtues, The Supreme Court 1960 Ten, 75 HARV. L. Rsv. 40, 44 (1961). The
question thus posed is when harm is to be presumed by operation of law simply as a result
of a statute shown to classify by race. The finding of harm might be on an irrebuttable or
rebuttable basis, whether in a blanket manner or only in given contexts.
45. One can imagine a scientific finding that persons of a certain pigmentation are sub-
stantially more susceptible to smallpox than other persons and a statute, based upon this
finding, requiring persons with such skin. to be vaccinated more frequently than members of
another race Given the validity of the scientific finding, this statute, admittedly classifying
on the basis of race, would probably be unchallengeable. One may even posit a statute
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Wright, regardless of the demonstrable harms or benefits of the districting stat-
ute on the members of the minority group.
In a society where more blatant forms of segregation and public racial
identifications have been means of inflicting social stigma and inferiority on
minority groups,46 however, it may be that any injury which results from the
employment of race as a criterion for drawing election districts is outweighed
by the benevolence of a statute which guarantees the election of a Negro Con-
gressman in a metropolitan community. Indeed, minority groups have been
said to achieve their measure of full "citizenship" in America by the act of elect-
ing "one of their own" to political office.47 Moreover, it may be that the con-
centration of members of a given race or ethnic group in a voting district stim-
ulates political interest and activity on the part of the members of the minority
group, who may feel that their vote really counts and their selection of a repre-
sentative meaningful. Thus, the New York districting statute, assuming it is
in fact based on criteria of race and nationality, may be viewed as "benign or
positive discrimination" 48 designed to enable Negroes and Puerto Ricans living
in New York to compete on "equal" terms with whites in the political arena. 40
classifying by race in the light of existing knowledge of relevant differences, although the
differences that would be relevant are not readily discernible. But cf. LA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, § 1296 (Supp. 1961) (statute requiring labeling of blood by race).
46. For a discussion of the context of the Southern segregation statutes, see Black,
The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
47. See generally LuDE..L, THE NATURE OF AMERICAN PoiaTIcs.
48. A theory of apportionment which places a sufficiently great premium on the ability
of groups had to gain reflection of their views through the election of one of their own
could ignore the presumptive harm the courts have found in all other statutes classifying
by race and thus remove the gerrymander from the ambit of the principle that racial classi-
fications are "constitutionally suspect." See notes 36, 44 supra.
It would appear that Judge Moore in his opinion subscribes to such a "reflective" theory
of apportionment. In suggesting that an effort to create a racial "mix" in a given district
is constitutionally impermissible, see note 20 supra, while strongly implying that the affirma-
tive creation of racial enclaves is permissible, see text at notes 18, 19, 21 supra, Judge
Moore may have implied that "communal constituencies" are of a higher constitutional
order than the oft-articulated principle of the irrelevance of race as a classificatory factor.
Note the manner in which he distinguishes the segregation cases:
The school cases are equally irrelevant. If it is to be found that only in the 17th
District is there and will there be throughout the years a Congressman who alone
can speak for the electorate of Manhattan as their representative further considera-
tion might be given to these cases. However, both major political parties would
vigorously dispute a finding that a lone Congressman from New York's 17th con-
trols or vitally influences all actions by the Congress, no niatter how able any such
incumbent might be.
211 F. Supp. at 466-67.
49. If so important a principle as the presumptive or per se invalidity of statutes based
on race must yield in situations involving affirmatively segregated voting districts, the need
for and benefit from such "reflective constituencies" ought to be great. Yet the most signifi-
cant study and defense of electoral institutions which are designed to mute majoritariav in-
fluence can be fairly read to argue against racial constituencies in the American context,
MAcrENzIE, FREE ELcrloNs (1958) is based on a survey of electoral experiences in
Europe and the new African states, warning of the dangers of "communal" elections. Al-
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If the teaching of Brown is that racial classifications are impermissible, re-
gardless of benefits, harms, or motives-and no cases decided since Brown are
inconsistent with this reading-should this principle apply to a racially drawn
districting statute, or should it be modified to allow for race in drawing political
districts? If the principle cannot or should not yield, the question remains
whether a court should at least treat the arrangement as an expedient com-
promise which, although if reconciliable with principle, should not be imme-
diately invalidated because of its possibly benevolent effects. That is, should
a court stay its hand and let racially drawn districts be until we know more
about them?5° Before these" questions can be answered, a further view of the
possible effects of districting on the basis of race or national origin seems neces-
sary.
The benevolent effects of racial districting may not be the only ones, for even
the most nobly motivated legislatures might in the long run be hurting the in-
terests of the minority groups they attempt to assist through racial districting.
As the plaintiffs pointed out in their brief, racially drawn districting statutes
may have far more subtle consequences than segregation at the polling booths
every two years:
Although a congressional election district is not as distinct an institution
as a public school, park, or beach, etc., it is, nevertheless, a governmentally
constructed political entity-the unit of government through which citizens
participate in their National Government. As such, it necessarily spavns
related groups and activities. Political campaign organizations are main-
tained on a permanent basis in Congressional districts; and institutional-
though recognizing that purely racial or other group constituencies may be "inevitable [for
the newly formed nation], because there is great pressure on the government to concede
elections, and the state of society is such that it woula not be realistic to elect represen-
tatives except as representatives of separate communities," Mackenzie points out the ten-
sions generated against the concept of national unity by the communal representation scheme
first devised to save it. "People entering public life learn first to talk the language of com-
munal politics, not that of national politics; communalism may thus defeat nationalism,
and destroy the possibility of national self-government" Id. at 34, 35. To the extent that a
sense of national unity exists in which "majorities [are] tolerant towards minorities [and]
minorities. . accept without violent resistance the verdict of a majority vote" Mackenzie
argues against the use of communal constituencies. Id. at 34. "Electoral engineering" is of
great value to Mackenzie to avoid "destroy[ed] democracy," see id. at 94, 95, but com-
munal constituencies are regarded as the least useful of the battery of devices available to
mute absolute majority rule.
The relevant question would thus appear to be not whether the moving principle of the
irrelevance of race ought to yield in the face of segregated voting districts but whether it
would be expedient to strike down segregated voting districts in light of the possible ad-
vantages which may accrue from them.
50. The latter question is the only relevant one. A judgment must be made as to
whether it -would be viable and helpful in terms of long range interests of the isolated
groups to permit the operation of racially based districts by deliberately choosing not to
effectuate the principle of the invidiousness of racial classifications in such cases. This
decision is a pragmatic one, rooted in the nature of, and potential abuse which may result
from, racially patterned political districts. See Brcm cr, THE L.AsT DANGROUs BRAcu
63-65 (1962).
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ized political hierarchy tends to be created and perpetuated along the line
demarcated by the districting statute; and patronage and other benefits of
government are distributed within the bounds of the district.5'
If these are among the necessary effects of racial districting-and the exist-
ence of Negro political clubs in the 18th district indicates they are--the "injury"
resulting from the deprivation of the opportunity to participate in various polit-
ical activities with members of another race or ethnic group seems similar to
those found or presumed to result from segregation of schools, parks, or golf
courses, Arguably these effects, even if they do exist, should be discounted or
disregarded since they are not as direct a result of the districting statute as
separation was of the statutes involved in the segregation decisions. Stated
differently, unlike the segregation cases, where separation was clearly the object
of the legislators in enacting laws providing for all-white and all-Negro parks
and schools, separate or segregated political clubs and activities may not be one
of the objects the legislators wanted to achieve in drawing districts based upon
race or national origin. But to maintain such distinctions as tenable is to ask a
court to inquire into what has traditionally been considered unascertainable
and therefore irrelevant-namely, the subjective intent of the legislators. If the
legislature in fact passed a racially drawn districting statute, then these effects
are as much a part of the legislative purpose as is the election of a Negro Con-
gressman. Therefore, they cannot be disregarded on the ground that they are
indirect or that they are not included in the effects the legislature desired when
it enacted a racially drawn districting statute.
Other effects, less subject to demonstration in a court room, but equally
important, are also likely. The racial groups placed in separate districts may
well be lulled into political torpor by the act of "allowing" them the selection
of a member of their race. Whatever honor may go to "the first of his race"
sitting in a legislature, it is quite possible that the interests of his group may be
assumed by the community to have been satisfied by an act which has no bear-
ing upon the advancement of his group's needs. Moreover, in places where
state legislatures are not so benignly motivated toward members of a minority
racial group, racially drawn districting statutes may be used not only to reflect
the interests of Negroes in the legislature but, as is more likely, to maintain a
concentration of racist votes in the adjacent white citizen districts. This con-
tainment function of racial gerrymanders portends a rather significant bulwark
against the influence of Negro votes in places where those votes are only now
beginning to be asserted. And unless surmises about the motives of legislatures
are to have constitutional significance, a court would be hard pressed to distin-
guish between a racially drawn districting statute in New York and Mississippi.
The earned election of a minority group member may well be an event merit-
ing genuine pride by its members; the price for such pride may be high when
the election is pre-arranged.
Taking a closer look at the political situation in Manhattan, for example, it
seems difficult to conclude that Negroes and Puerto Ricans are not harmed by
51. Plaintiffs' Post-Trial and Reply Memorandum, p. 26.
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being lumped into a single congressional district. Although such action guar-
antees the election of a Negro Congressman, could it not otherwise be possible
for a group representing nearly 40 per cent of the Borough population to have
more influence in Congress? The last two Borough Presidents of Manhattan
have been Negroes; it therefore does not seem plausible to argue that the
Negroes of the borough need segregation to elect a Negro to public office. In
the absence of racial and ethnic districting, could not the Negroes and Puerto
Ricans become the pivotal voters in every one of the Manhattan congressional
districts and thereby multiply their chances of electing more than one non-white
Congressman? In addition, arranging the racial composition of the congres-
sional districts by such means might lead the remaining Congressmen in the
borough to feel that legislative action involving the interests of Negroes are
matters of unconcern, such matters having been exported to the single Con-
gressman representing the Negro population. It also is possible that a system
which lumps Negroes and Puerto Ricans into a single constituency forfeits the
leadership opportunities of whichever of the two groups is in the minority in
the artificially created district. There is a notable absence of political power and
patronage among Puerto Ricans in New York in those areas where Negroes
and Puerto Ricans live together. Courts therefore might easily be mistaken if
they assume that an identity of interest exists among the different minority
groups lumped together for "benign" purposes. Further, is it not possible that
the voices favoring districts of a particular racial composition are those of spe-
cial pleaders with vested interests in maintaining jobs they may now hold by
dint of the ghetto character of the borough political structure?5
2
If such questions do not yield clear answers, it would seem that the inherent
constitutional bias against the use of race as a device by which the state may
classify ought to negative such statutes when they are admitted or proven to
have been drawn on a racial basis. If states are beginning to take initial steps
in the creation of what have been referred to as "benign quotas" as a means of
establishing for various minorities what in a contract context has been called
"equality of bargaining position,"3 it may well be that courts should not im-
mediately strike down all statutes that are shown or admitted to have classified
on a basis of race.5M Nonetheless, before judicial approval or tolerance of such
experiments is granted, a more sure-footed judgment ought to be made as to
the real effect of a statute than can be made about racially segregated voting
districts. Unlike the districting cases in which the complaint has been that of
unequal populations for like legislative districts, there is a ready ulthua ratio
52. Cf. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1962, p. 1, col. 6 (city ed.), N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1962,
p. 1, col. 2 (city ed.), noted in Bickel, The Durabiliy of Colegrovm t. Green, 72 YA.E
L.J. 39, 43 n.18 (1962), 211 F. Supp. at 461 (entrance of Adam Clayton Powell as party
defendant-intervenor to the Wright suit).
53. 'Cf. Note, 70 YALE LJ. 126 (1960), Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp.
681, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded for nezv trial, 286 F2d 222 (1961) (condemnation
for park use of land of private developer with announced intention of setting up benign
quota housing project), Bittker, supra note 36 (hypothetical municipal ordinance forcing
alternate sale of adjacent land plots to whites and Negroes).
54. See BicKa.i, op. cit. supra note 50.
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by which Wright and others like it may be disposed: the irrelevance of race as
a classificatory basis used by the state. Such a broad moving principle might
have determined the school segregation cases,5 and more clearly the post-
Brown per curiam decisions invalidating segregation in such areas as public
parks, beaches, and golf courses. The principle should be dispositive of the
threshhold constitutional question in Wright as well.56
The Fifteenth Amendment Case 5
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot 58 the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama
statute " which had rearranged the boundary lines of the City of Tuskegee so
as to exclude the vast majority of Negro voters who had previously resided
within it.60 Writing for the Court in Gomillion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter im-
plied that there had been a deprivation of voting rights of Negroes, who by
virtue of the redistricting statute were denied the right to vote in Tuskegee
elections. Before the statute, Negroes were permitted to vote in federal, state,
county, and municipal elections. After the statute, it was said, the right to vote
in municipal elections had been taken away from them. 1
This does not seem to be the case, however. An Alabama statute,0 2 an at-
tempted repeal of which had been defeated at the same time the challenged
districting statute had been passed, 3 permitted any group of 75 contiguously
55. See Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 150 (1955); Cahn, Jursprudnce, 31
N.Y.U.L. REv. 182 (1956) ; Pollak, Social Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply
to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959). But see note 43 supra.
56. It should be noted that in Wright, the focuv of plaintiffs' case was on the predomi-
nantly white 17th Congressional District, with the argument advanced that it was deliber-
ately kept smaller to insulate a predicted Caucasion minority from a growing Negro
borough population. If that be true, whatever benevolence the statute might have is thus
for the protection of whites from Negroes, a purpose hardly in line with the suggested
justification of benign quotas: the advancement of the interests of those groupq temporarily
disadvantaged by reason of historical discrimination practiced against them. Absent a sub-
ordination of the principle of the irrelevance of race to that of the need for racially "re-
flective" constituencies, see note 43 supra, the Manhattan situation is thus less deserving of
judicial tenderness than other "benign" racial districts might arguably be.
57. See statement of Mr. Justice Douglas in Baker v. Carr:
Race, color or previous condition, of servitude are impermissible standards by reason
of the Fifteenth Amendment, and that alone is sufficient to explain Gomillion v.
Lightfoot.
369 U.S. at 244.
58. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
59. Laws Ala. 1957, p. 185, Local Act No. 140.
60. There were 400 registered Negro voters living in Tuskeegee prior to the passage
of Act 140. All but five were excized from the newly formed municipality with no registered
white voters being eliminated. The city had 6,707 residents, of which 5,397 were Negro
prior to the passage of the Act. The new city had a population of 1,750, 75% of whom were
white. Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1961 SuPRU.?g
CouRT RmvIEW 194, 195-96. [Hereinafter cited as Lucas.)
61. 364 U.S. at 341.
62. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 10 (1958).
63. Lucas at 210-11. The analysis under the fifteenth amendment is basically that of
Dean Lucas and was adopted by Judge Feinberg at trial, 211 F. Supp. at 468-69.
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domiciled Alabama voters to form a municipality of their own by filing a motion
with the clerk of the county court. Such action, which would grant the parties
in the newly formed cities all the rights accruing to municipalities in the state,
could be taken by voters residing in unincorporated areas. Therefore the ex-
cluded voters, although nominally deprived of the right they previously had to
vote in municipal elections, could have reacquired this right, albeit in a different
munioipality, by the act of filing a motion with the county court.
Although the redistricting statute in Gomillion did not absolutely deprive
these Negroes of voting rights in municipal elections, it does appear that the
Negro voters because of their race had been removed from a municipality which
was more amenable to political representation and municipal services."4 Alter-
natively, the white voters because of their race were given a municipality not
built up entirely by their tax moneys. Although it is not clear that these facts
were fully argued to the Court in Gomillion,0 5 it is arguable that the decision
rested upon something more than the nominal deprivation of a pre-existing right
to vote; rather the decision may be read to have held that movement of the Tus-
keegee Negroes into a less potentially serviceable constituency on grounds of
race constituted an abridgment of the right to vote under the fifteenth amend-
ment.6 6 If this is what the Court in fact held in Gomillion, the scope of the
fifteenth amendment's protection of the right to vote would include not only a
right to exercise a franchise in any election but also a right to all the benefits
and power which were formerly an inseparable part of the franchise.
Given this reading of Gomillion and its broad interpretation of "vote," as
that term is used in the fifteenth amendment, the 12 per cent disparity in vot-
ing strength between voters of the Negro and the white Manhattan congres-
sional districts, although probably not exceeding permissible tolerances under
the fourteenth amendment, becomes highly significant. If it can be established
that the district lines in Manhattan were drawn along racial lines, then the
lesser voting strength of the residents of the non-white and Puerto Rican 18th
Congressional District may be said to have been caused by reason of their race.
May members of minority groups be permitted a measurable, albeit small, dilu-
tion of their vote in order to assure representation by one of their own kind?
Under the above interpretation of Gomillion, this question would probably be
answered in the negative. Were the 17th Congressional District equal in popu-
lation size to all others in Manhattan, under the above analysis no fifteenth
amendment case could be made.67 However, the incremental voting muscle
64. Lucas at 210-13.
65. Id. at 213.
66. See id. at 233-34. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 1 reads as follows:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or any State on account of race, color or previous condition of
servitude-
67. The analysis presented herein is midway between that of Mr. Justice Douglas, who
would find a fifteenth amendment violation on the sole strength of racial districting, see
note 57 supra, and that of Mr. Justice Franlfurter who articulated the test in terms of
nothing less than a denial of a vote, see note 61 upra.
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given certain voters because they are white, as well as the concomitant sub-
traction of power from Negro and Puerto Rican voters tends to make out a
case under the fifteenth amendment. And it would appear that this result under
the fifteenth amendment would not be different even if it were constitutionally
permissible for legislatures to establish "benign" voting districts under the
fourteenth amendment.
Some Problems of Proof
If either the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments proscribe voting districts
based on racial criteria, the crucial issue in Wright becomes one of proof. As
Judge Murphy pointed out in his dissent, there was no "oral or written state-
ment made by the legislature either in the form of a committee report or from
the manager of the bill, or statements from the legislators themselves" showing
an express legislative intent to establish districts on a racial basis.08 No public
hearings were held on the bill, which was adopted by a straight party line vote.
Even in the absence of such testimony, however, courts must ascertain what
may loosely be called the legislative intent. If one enunciates a test based solely
on the de facto nature, or effect of the statute, rather than the legislative pur-
pose which generated its passage, the problem can appear delusively simple.
Such an approach finds the constitutional evil in the fact that people bearing
a given trait-such as race-find themselves grouped together after the passage
of the statute, rather than in the fact that the legislature has used a forbidden
criterion. This approach tends to ignore the possibility of voluntary groupings
of people with like traits. Moreover, assuming that racial homogeneity is bad if
it is the result of a districting statute, the question must be asked as to how
much homogeneity is needed to discredit the statute. A mathematical quagmire
looms for courts forced to decide whether a given degree of racial homogeneity
-for example the 94.9 per cent and 86.6 per cent in two of the Wright districts
-is to be given sufficient force to decide the case in and of itself, or even create
a prima facie case. If the quantum of racial homogeneity is to be the principal
determinative fact in these cases, legislatures may immunize districts purposely
drawn to reflect racial characteristics. Further, if the fact of racial homogeneity
is regarded as the constitutional evil, state legislatures are forced to employ
racial criteria in drawing district lines so as to avoid a constitutionally imper-
missible, or even constitutionally suspect, grouping of members of the same
race. Thus under the "effects" test the use of factors such as race becomes man-
datory rather than forbidden. Since the operative principle in these cases is that
race is a constitutional irrelevance, 69 this result seems anomalous. Moreover,
the difficulties imposed on legislatures by such an approach multiply as the
number of impermissible groupings increases. For example, if homogeneity of
members of a political party or an economic class are regarded along with race
as invalidating factors or groupings, legislatures in drawing district lines will be
forced to strike proper "mixes" of citizens with respect to political affiliation
68.. 211 F. Supp. at 473.
69. See note 48 supra.
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and economic status as well as race in order to immunize their statutes from
judicial attack.
The divergence in approaches is perhaps best put in terms of the question of
whether the "segregation" condemned in Brown and the post-Brown per curiam
decisions is a noun or verb. The issue can be seen in the northern school segre-
gation cases, in which two courts, while reaching the same result, approached
the Brown decision from different perspectives. In the case of Branche v. Board
of Education of Hempstead 70 Judge Dooling suggested that school boards are
under a duty affirmatively to avoid even accidental racial groupings or, in other
words, are under a duty to integrate school districts. He denied the board's
motion for summary judgment, despite a failure on the plaintiffs' part to
counter the board's allegation that:
[T]hey... have not by any design, pattern of conduct, or contrivance
created or maintained segregated education... because the distribution of
white and Negro children.. . is the result solely of the residential pattern
of the district; that the school boundary zones are not "gerrymandered"
but dravn solely on the basis of the considerations proper to the design of




[Ilt is not enough'to show that residence accounts for the fact of segre-
gation and to contend that therefore the segregation is ineluctable. The
effort to mitigate the consequent educational inadequacy has not been made
and to forego that effort to deal with the inadequacy is to impose it in the
absence of a conclusive demonstration that no circumstantially possible
effort can effect any significant mitigation. What is involved here is not
convenience but constitutional interests.
72
This is distinctly a minority approach even for school district cases 1 3 -where
the harm visited is clearly more immediate and apparent than that caused by
segregated voting districts.
The more orthodox approach was taken in Taylor v. Board of Education of
New Rochelle.74 Suit was brought to enjoin a board of education from pro-
ceeding with the construction of a new school in a segregated district, and from
refusing to allow Negro students to transfer to other school districts. The
Second Circuit upheld a decision for the plaintiffs on the basis of testimony
that thirty years prior to the litigation, the board of education had made cer-
tain changes in the school districting master plan in order to guarantee an al-
most all Negro make-up within the challenged district. The court found that
by its inertia the current school board had continued the original purposive act
70. 204 F. Supp. 150 (1962).
71. Id. at 151.
72. Id. at 153.
73. See, e.g., Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School Dist., 241 F2d 230, 233 (5th
Cir. 1957) ; Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Allen v. County School
Bd., 249 F.2d 462, 465 (4th Cir. 1957); Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.
S.C. 1955).
74. 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (Zd Cir. 1961).
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and should therefore be held responsible to repair the damage generated by it.Y
Implicit in this ruling in Taylor is that de facto segregation whose causes might
be myriad is not per se unconstitutional. Other courts have refused to overthrow
districts or enjoin future school board actions which admittedly have the effect
of increasing racial homogeneity on the ground that there was no showing that
race was a part of the legislative purpose.76
In Norris v. Alabama 77 and Hernandez v. Texas,7 8 the Supreme Court
determined that there was systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury service
through the use of a de facto "effects" test. Thus a prima facie case was held
to have been established solely on the strength of a comparison between the
number of minority group members residing within a given community and
the number of members of that group who had served on its juries. In both
cases, the unrebutted evidence was that no members of the complaining minor-
ity groups had ever served on the juries of their respective communities, al-
though substantial numbers of them resided in those communities. Such a
showing, said the Court, established a prima facie case of systematic jury ex-
clusion, and required the state either to rebut the plaintiffs' evidence of the
infrequency of selection of minority group members, or to suggest alternative
explanations of these facts.
In Norris and Hernandez, however, a prima facie case could be based solely
on a showing of the de facto situation because only two logical inferences were
possible-systematic exclusion of members of the minority group from the jury
rolls or no such exclusion. By their showing that no members of the minority
group had served on a jury, the plaintiffs created a clear inference of systematic
exclusion. Chance-the only other possible explanation of the figures-is so
clearly unlikely that a prima facie case was established. In Wright and other
gerrymander challenges, however, a showing even of 100 per cent racial homo-
geneity in a challenged district still leaves the logical possibility that the situa-
tion may be explained on many other and permissible bases. The probability
or improbability of the alternative explanations cannot be clearly established
without some empirical investigation.
An inquiry into whether the legislature purposefully drew district lines on a
racial basis need not be an exercise in metaphysics or group psychoanalysis.
The purpose test would impose a burden on the plaintiff to show that the use
of a racial criterion is a more reasonable inference than that of other permissible
factors which might have been used. The question then arises as to which per-
missible factors must be shown to be a less likely basis than the impermissible
one. A challenge to a districting statute might be said to require the plaintiff
to rebut any possible basis that is constitutionally permissible. This seems to
be the view of Judge Feinberg, who implied that refusal to find a prima facie
case was based on both the failure of the plaintiffs to fulfill their persuasion
75. 191 F. Supp. at 192-93, 294 F.2d at 38.
76. See, e.g., Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87, 91 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
77. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
78. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
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burden as to the alternative purposes they did try to prove were less likely than
race; and on their failure to meet their production burden as to other possible
bases on which the districting statute might have been drawn. Thus, he stated
that the plaintiffs failed to disprove the possibility of social and economic group-
ings,7 9 although the facts on which this inference was based were not alleged
by either the plaintiff or defendant.
Arguably this requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that the impermis-
sible factor more plausibly explains the challenged statute than any permissible
factors is desirable, although the court or the defendant should be under some
obligation to suggest factors that the moving party must rebut. Such a proce-
dure has the advantage of forcing the court to make articulate and therefore
readily appealable its judgments as to whether given districting bases are per-
missible. For example, had the plaintiffs in Wright been requested by the court
to prove that the factor of political affiliation was not a more plausible basis of
the configuration of the 17th Congressional District than race, an appeal could
have been taken on the issue of whether states may draw district lines on the
basis of politics.80 The same might have been done on the issue of wealth, a
basis which may well in fact be a more plausible reason for the shape of the
17th district, long termed the "silk stocking district."
On the other hand, requiring a plaintiff to disprove all other permissible
bases seems to impose on him the impossible task of rebutting all phantom
bases on which a statute might have been drawn. Without requiring a state to
introduce evidence tending to show some other explanation for the statute, a
court could not generally determine whether other alleged bases are plausible.
And without this determination the moving party in districting cases might
never establish a prima facie case. In other words, at some point the burden of
introducing evidence to substantiate the claim of other permissible bases of the
challenged statute must shift to the state. It would seem that this point should
be reached when the plaintiffs have established that race is the more likely basis
than the more commonly known and expected bases of districting. In Wright,
the plaintiffs showed race to be a more plausible explanation of the 17th Con-
gressional District than at least three apparently permissible legislative pur-
poses: the objective of constructing districts in a compact fashion along rea-
79. 211 F. Supp. at 471. A discussion of the constitutionality of district lines drawn
on the basis of political affiliation is outside the scope of this Note. What is important is
that a judicial determination can independently be made on the merits of the permissibility
of politics as a factor in the apportionment. For a discussion of the legitimacy of political
factors in apportionment see Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apporlionments: A
Problemn of Standards, 72 YALE L.J. 968, 999 (1963).
80. After the close of trial in Wright all parties were requested to stipulate certain
facts with respect to the political affiliations of parties in the borderline census tracts of
the 17th Congressional District. The plaintiffs refused to accede, claiming in the alternative
that evidence as to political affiliation, was irrelevant and that, if relevant, a formal reopen-
ing of the trial was necessary so that all facts with respect to political affiliations could be
brought out. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Response to Request for Stipulation, pp. 2-13.
Evidence as to political alignments in Manhattan was therefore not considered by the
trial panel. 211 F. Supp. at 470 n.ll.
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sonably geometric lines; the objective of constructing districts reflecting pre-
existing political institutions; and the objective of constructing a district re-
flecting natural geographic boundaries. This proof should have been found to
establish a prima facie case, for it does not appear that there are, nor did Judge
Feinberg find, other clearly permissible bases for districting that the plaintiffs
failed to disprove. Race was therefore the more likely inference. The burden of
alleging and proving the factors of politics and wealth, as Judge Murphy sug-
gested, should have been on the defendants. If these factors were established,
other, perhaps distinct, constitutional questions would have been posed.
Conclusion
A reversal of Wright need not be seismic in its implications for the judicial
system. Because of the proof problems inherent in making a showing of pur-
poseful use of impermissible factors, a legislature wishing to construct voting
districts along racial lines could mute the harshness of its gerrymanders and
thus probably avoid judicial invalidation of such legislation. So long as respon-
sibility for legislative districting remains vested in the legislatures, courts are
not ultimately capable of thwarting legislative designs to mold apportionment
schemes to the benefit or detriment of whichever groups they so choose to
affect. Nor should they be. The judicial function in cases like Wright need be
no more than to invalidate those acts that are flagrant in their use of impermis-
sible criteria and thus to inhibit future legislative use of such factors.
Courts dealing with gerrymander challenges are not faced with the institu-
tional difficulties which plague attempts to resolve challenges to equally weighted
districts having sizeable population disparities. In the latter instance, in the
absence of any constitutionally enforceable standard setting down a tolerance
for population disparities, courts may in some measure be led to permit their
likes and dislikes for particular fact situations be dispositive.8 1 Courts may thus
"bless ... expedient arrangements that legislatures will make," and validate
objectionable apportionment schemes which are nonetheless held to pass con-
stitutional muster.82 No such problems attach to the Wright litigation or chal-
lenges involving districting allegedly drawn on any impermissible basis. In such
cases the nature of the proceeding is radically different. Plaintiffs are obligated
to satisfy the trier of fact of a factual question-that the state has used criteria
forbidden to it. And prior judicial decisions have generally established that
the criteria are impermissible. The problems involved in proving such use and
in determining the permissibility of the various possible bases of districting
statutes are of a sort which have historically been dealt with by the courts under
81. The classic objection to extended future use of Baker v. Carr is the felt absence of
a fixed polestar towards which courts can gravitate. See Bickel, Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, The Supreme Court, 1960 Termn, 75 Haav. L. Rxv. 40 (1961) ; Israel, On Chart.
ing A Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future of Baker v. Carr, 61
MiCH. L. IZv. 107, 130-46 (1962). Cf. McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case,
the Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 67-74 (1962). But see Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legis-
lative Apportionments: A Problem of Standards, 72 YALE L.J. 968 (1963).
82. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 44 (1962).
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the equal protection clause and the fifteenth amendment. Indeed, the Wright
litigation itself may eventuate in findings as to the permissibility of the use of
such factors as wealth and political affiliation by legislatures in drawing legis-
lative district lines.8a
In light of the limited nature of the judicial relief ultimately available, it
would be unfortunate if none were afforded in cases like Wright. For there
the gerrymander could hardly be less patent. Should the Wright decision be
sustained, states could with impunity draw legislative district lines on whatever
bases they chose, so long as they kept the population disparities between equal-
ly weighted districts within constitutional bounds. The point has been aptly
made that so long as the principle of "equal representation" remains the motive
force behind Baker v. Carr,84 a failure to deal with the problems of the gerry-
mander may give the Baker decision the thrust of "one half a pair of pliers."85
Given the greater facility with which courts can deal with the gerrymander
problem, as well as the general public expectance and demand for judicial sup-
port 8s in a field where reform, if any, is to come from the courts,8 abstinence
in Wright would indeed be unfortunate.
83. There is much to suggest that the district lines in Manhattan were drawn oir the
basis of politics. The defendant-intervenors in the case so asserted as an affirmative defense
of the apportionment
84. Such was the standard suggested by the government in Baker ',. Carr.
85. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. Rx%. 252, 275-78
(1962). Dean Neal's analysis is extremely revealing in terms of logical imperatives imposed
on the courts for dealing with gerrymander cases given an involvement in malapportion-
ment cases. His suggestion is that the courts recede from the entire area of apportionment
challenges, a suggestion hardly likely to find much favor with the courts. So long as mal-
apportionment challenges similar to Baker v. Carr are dealt with, however, Dean Neal is
persuasive in suggesting the need to find some manageable basis on which gerrymander
cases can be dealt with.
86. See, e.g., Ascoli, Reporter's Notes, The Reporter, April 1-12, 1962, p. 12.
87. See generally Lewis, Legislaivc 4Apportionment and the Federal Courls, 71 H v.
L. REv. 1057 (1958).
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